Constitutional Law - Due Process - Expulsion of Student fro m State-Operated College Without Notice or Hearing by McDermott, James A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 4 
1962 
Constitutional Law - Due Process - Expulsion of Student fro m 
State-Operated College Without Notice or Hearing 
James A. McDermott 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional 
Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law and Race Commons, State and Local 
Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James A. McDermott, Constitutional Law - Due Process - Expulsion of Student fro m State-Operated 
College Without Notice or Hearing, 60 MICH. L. REV. 499 (1962). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/5 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS 
CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW - DuE PROCESS - EXPULSION OF STUDENT FROM 
STATE-OPERATED COLLEGE WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING - A substantial 
number of students at the Alabama State College for Negroes had been 
participating in peaceful demonstrations protesting racial segregation. 
The president of the college advised the students to return to their 
studies which were disrupted by these demonstrations, and personally 
warned three of the plaintiffs to discontinue their participation in the 
demonstrations. Nonetheless, further demonstrations ensued in which the 
plaintiffs took part. The State Board of Education then voted to expel 
the plaintiffs who were allegedly the leaders of the organization responsible 
for the demonstrations. The notices of expulsion mailed to the plaintiffs 
stated no reason for the action taken and at no time were the plaintiffs 
provided with an opportunity to appear before the Board.1 Upon the 
plaintiffs' suit to enjoin the Board from obstructing their right to attend 
the college, the district court upheld the expulsions and denied injunctive 
relief.2 On appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Due process re-
quires that notice and some opportunity for a hearing be given before 
students at a state-operated college can be expelled for misconduct. Dixon 
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 930 (1961). 
The conduct of a state administrative agency acting wholly within the 
domain of state interest is insulated from federal judicial review.3 Public 
education is generally conceded to be a matter reserved for state adminis-
trative control.4 In consequence, it has been held that a federal court is 
not a competent tribunal in which to seek review of administrative action 
resulting in the expulsion of a student from a state university.5 But 
the weight of authority holds that the insulation from federal judicial 
review is ineffectual where such administrative action transgresses a right 
protected by the federal due process clause.6 However, before a complainant 
1 Principal case at 152-55; see also the lower court's review of the facts, Dixon v. 
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 947-49 (M.D. Ala. 1960). 
2 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note I. 
8 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). 
4 See Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. 
denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 929 (E.D. 
La. 1960), afj'd mem., 365 U.S. 569 (1961); State ex rel. Steinle v. Faust, 55 Ohio App. 
370, 376, 9 N.E.2d 912, 914 (1937). Concomitantly, the state is the source of the privilege 
of attending a state-operated university. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
293 U.S. 245, 261 (1934). 
5 Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 16-18 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. 
denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960). 
6 See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 258 (1934); Steier v. 
New York State Educ. Comm'r, supra note 6, at 21 (concurring opinion); Webb v. State 
Univ., 120 F. Supp. 554, 558-59 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 867 (1954). 
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may properly invoke the due process clause he must demonstrate that he 
has been deprived of "life, liberty, or property" by the state.7 While the 
court in the principal case found that such a deprivation had occurred, its 
opinion does not disclose the basis of the finding.8 
Clearly the expulsion of the plaintiffs by the Board constituted state 
action.9 The difficult problem in the principal case was posed by the lower 
court when it asserted that "the right to attend a public college or uni-
versity is not in and of itself a constitutional right."10 This position, in 
presupposing that the meanings of "right" and "life, liberty, or property" 
are coterminous, ignores the possibility that a student, once he has matricu-
lated, may acquire an interest in continuing his education at a state uni-
versity. The student's interest is best described as a privilege, for it is 
acquired not as a matter of "right" but as a matter of discretion on the 
part of the state. And the Supreme Court has recognized that some privi-
leges, once granted by the government, may not constitutionally be revoked 
without compliance with due process of law, even where the recipient 
cannot be said to have had initially the abstract "right" to the enjoyment 
of the privilege.11 Thus, the proper question in determining whether an 
expelled student is entitled to the protection of the due process clause is 
whether the privilege granted to him is included within the meaning of 
the phrase "life, liberty, or property." 
On two occasions the Supreme Court has reviewed the claim of a stu-
dent that his expulsion from a state university resulted in a denial of due 
process.12 In both cases the Court found the state interest sufficient to 
justify expulsion and it did not rule on the question of whether the stu-
dent's privilege was encompassed within the meaning of "life, liberty, or 
property."13 But, because the Court in each case stressed the point that 
7 See Pick.us v. Board of Educ., 9 Ill. 2d 599, 606, 138 N.E.2d 532, 536 (1956); Port 
of Tacoma v. Parosa, 52 Wash. 2d 181, 193, 324 P .2d 438, 445 (1958) • 
s The court stated: "The precise nature of the private interest involved in this case 
is the right to remain at a public institution of higher learning in which the plaintiffs 
were students in good standing." Principal case at 157. This, at most, states a conclu-
sion. No explanation was offered as to why this "right" was properly includible within 
the scope of either "liberty" or "property" as used in the due process clause. 
9 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
10 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Ala. 1960). 
11 This principle is best exemplified in the area of governmental employment. 
See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961); Slochower v. Board 
of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 
(1952). But see Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afj'd per curiam 
by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), where the court stated, "due process 
of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of something to which he has a 
right." See generally Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. 
R.Ev. 193, 222-80 (1956) . 
12 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Waugh v. 
TrusteeS- of the Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915) . 
13 The Court explicitly declined to rule on this point, id. at 597. 
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the student was subject to a paramount governmental interest in the ex-
ercise of his privilege, it might be inferred that the Court felt it was 
displacing a constitutionally protected, albeit limited, interest. A limita-
tion of this interest may appropriately be construed as an impairment of 
the student's "liberty."14 "Liberty" is not limited to mere freedom from 
physical restraint.15 Positively, it involves a conception of freedom of indi-
vidual endeavor as secured by restraints on unwarranted state interfer-
ence.16 If it is agreed that a person has an inherent freedom to pursue 
knowledge and that a formal education, while not essential to this objec-
tive, is intimately associated with its effective accomplishment, then the 
revocation of the privilege of acquiring an education may be regarded as 
an interference with the student's liberty in his pursuit of knowledge. 
This reasoning appears to be compatible with the thinking of the 
Supreme Court. "Liberty" has repeatedly been said to acknowledge the 
right of a person "to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties .... "17 
It includes the "right to acquire useful knowledge."18 The Court has 
expressed the belief that the freedom "to inquire, to study and to evaluate, 
to gain new maturity and understanding ... " is essential to the preserva-
tion of our civilization.19 It has even been suggested that the freedom to 
pursue knowledge is as sacrosanct as the freedom to enjoy one's religious 
belief.20 These postulates have recently found tacit approval in the case 
14 While it is improbable that the privilege of acquiring an education would be 
construed as a "property" right, there is some authority for such a construction. See 
State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 
U.S. 748 (1943), in which the court stated in dictum that the right to study-as well 
as to practice-medicine was a "property" right protected by the due process clause. 
While the right to practice a profession had been recognized as a "property" right 
protected by the due process clause, the court did not explain why the extension of the 
"property" concept to the preparation for professional practice, as distinguished from 
the practice itself, was warranted. But, even assuming this extension was proper, the 
further enlargement of it to include non-professional undergraduate study would 
appear to be tenuous, although not infeasible. 
15 See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) ; Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
See generally Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, 20 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 183 (1945); Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term Liberty, 4 
HARV. L. REv. 365 (1891) • 
16 See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
supra note 15, at 399-400; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 18 (1915). See generally Green, 
Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 497 (1942); Warran, The 
New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431 (1926) • 
17 See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
18 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) . 
19 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
20 "[I]n the eye of the law the right to enjoy one's religious belief, unmolested by 
any human power, is no more sacred nor more fully or distinctly recognized than is 
the right to impart and receive instruction not harmful to the public. The denial of 
either right would be an infringement of the liberty inherent in the freedom secured 
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of Bolling v. Sharpe21 where the Court held the racial segregation of 
Negro school-children in the District of Columbia to constitute an arbitrary 
deprivation of their liberty. The reason given for the holding was that 
"Liberty under the law extends to the full range of conduct which the 
individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper 
governmental objective."22 If the school child's privilege of acquiring an 
education free from improper governmental restraint is held to constitute 
a civil "liberty," then, by analogy, the corresponding privilege of a student 
at an advanced level in a state university should similarly be recognized. 
If such a conclusion is accepted, then the due process clause is properly 
applicable to the Board's action in the principal case. 
It remains, then, to determine what procedural limitations on the dis-
missal process are necessary to satisfy "due process of law." The Supreme 
Court has held that where a state administrative agency renders an adjudi-
cation depriving a person of a constitutionally protected interest, unless 
compelling circumstances dictate otherwise, due process requires that notice 
and some opportunity for a hearing be provided.23 Since it is unlikely 
that, on the facts of the principal case, the state interest asserted greatly 
outweighs the private interest impaired, it appears that the court's require-
ment that a hearing be held is proper.24 The particular procedure sug-
by the fundamental law." Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Berea College v. Kentucky, 
211 U.S. 45, 68 (1908) • 
21 347 U.S. 497 (1954). This case was a companion to Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954) • Since the fifth amendment does not contain the "equal protection" 
clause found in the fourteenth amendment, the Court chose to decide the question on 
the basis of a deprivation of "liberty." With certain qualifications not here material, 
the meanings of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments are 
coextensive. See Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. !110, 325 (1903); French v. Barber Asphalt 
Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 329 (1901) • Therefore it is proper to tum to the fifth amend-
ment interpretations of "liberty" to ascertain its meaning as used in the fourteenth 
amendment. 
22 347 U.S. at 499-500. 
23 See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956); Dohany v. 
Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930) ; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 707-
11 (1884). Cf. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 900·01 (1961); Greene v. 
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123, 143, 161-62, 175-78 (1951) (concurring opinions). 
24 A distinction should be drawn between the Board's role in the adjudication of 
disputed facts and its function in formulating policy for the administration of state 
colleges. If the decision in the principal case is construed to mean that a hearing is 
required for the purpose of contesting the evidence upon which the expulsion order 
is to be based, the requirement of procedural regularity is warranted. The court's 
opinion does suggest that only factual determinations were contemplated. See principal 
case at 155. But, if the decision calls for a hearing upon the reason for expulsion a more 
difficult problem is presented. In general, a hearing is not required upon administrative 
decisions as to policy matters. See, e.g., Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1919); 
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) • See generally 
Davis, supra note 11, at 194-222. Certainly a determination by the Board that peaceful 
demonstrations protesting racial segregation are sufficiently inimical to the college's 
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gested by the court in the principal case21S is in accord with the authority 
on this subject. While a formal trial is unnecessary, the matter should be 
determined by a disinterested and unbiased tribunal.26 The student should 
be given notice of the specific charges and grounds, which, if proved, would 
justify his expulsion.27 While the student should be provided with the 
names of the witnesses testifying against him, together with an oral or 
written report of the facts to which each witness testifies,28 the weight of 
authority is against permitting him to cross-examine them.29 Finally, the 
student should be allowed to present evidence in his favor or to offer a 
justification for his alleged misconduct.80 While these requirements do not 
contravene the power of decision itself, they do provide the student with 
some guarantee against an arbitrary or capricious dismissal. Certainly the 
restrictions thus imposed upon the school authorities are not unduly 
burdensome when the resulting injury to the student through expulsion 
is considered. 
James A. McDermott 
welfare to justify expulsion would be more legislative than adjudicative in character, 
There is reason to doubt, therefore, that the plaintiffs should be entitled to a hearing 
to contest the propriety or desirability of the policy decision upon which their ex• 
pulsion rests. 
25 Principal case at 158-59. 
20 Cf. Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144, 157 (Cir. Ct. Cuyahoga 
County 1901) . 
27 State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 216, 268 Pac. 488, 486, cert. denied, 
277 U.S. 591 (1928) : Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77, 82 
(1887); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 109, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942) • 
cert. denied, 819 U.S. 748 (1948). 
28 See Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, supra note 27; State ex rel. Sherman 
v. Hyman, supra note 27, at 110, 171 S.W.2d at 826, 
20 See People ex rel. Bluett v. University of Ill., 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 210, 184 N.E.2d 
635, 637 _(1956); State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 216, 268 Pac. 488, 486, 
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 581 (1928) ; Sta~e ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 110, 
171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942), cert. denied, 819 U.S. 748 (1948). Contra, Commonwealth 
ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 8 Pa. County Ct. 77, 82 (1887) • 
30 See State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, supra note 29, at 216, 263 Pac. at 486; Com-
monwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, supra note 29, at 82; State ex rel. Sherman v. 
Hyman, supra note 29, at 110, 171 S.W.2d at 826. But cf. People ex rel. Bluett v. Uni-
versity of Ill., supra note 29, at 211, 184 N.E,2d at 687. 
